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AUGUST 12, 1952
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Town Meeting



BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

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Is the United States By-Passing the United Nations?

Moderator, QUINCY HOWE

S p e a k e r s

PORTER McKEEVER

THOMAS J. HAMILTON



—COMING—

—August 19, 1952—

What Next in the Middle East?

Published by THE TOWN HALL, Inc., New York 36, N. Y.

VOLUME 18, NUMBER 13



\$5.00 A YEAR, 15c A COPY



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Vol. 18

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The Broadcast of August 12, 1952, from 9:00 to 9:45 p.m., over the American Broadcasting Company Radio Network, originated from the Ritz Theater, New York City.

The account of the meeting reported in this Bulletin was transcribed from recordings made of the actual broadcast and represents the exact content of the meeting as nearly as such mechanism permits. The publishers and printer are not responsible for the statements of the speakers or the points of views presented.

THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

PROFESSOR MCKEEVER—Former Director of Public Information, U. S. Delegation to the United Nations, now Executive Director of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. McKeever was a key official of the United States Mission to the United Nations from the beginning of its operations in the United States until his resignation on June 1. He joined the U.S. Mission as its press officer in 1946 and the following year was appointed Director of Information. Since 1947 he has also served as chief public relations advisor to all U.S. Delegations to the annual General Assemblies of the United Nations, including those in Paris in 1948 and 1951. Mr. McKeever is a native of South Dakota. He attended Columbia University and became a newspaper correspondent in Washington, D.C. in 1937. Two years later he owned and managed a Washington news bureau for papers and radio stations in the southeastern section of the United States. Mr. McKeever entered government service with the initiation of the overseas information program in 1941.

THOMAS J. HAMILTON—United Nations correspondent for the *New York Times*. Mr. Hamilton has covered the entire atomic-disarmament controversy in the United Nations. His reports, together with those of ten correspondents under his direction, won high praise for their value in educating public opinion and in keeping the delegates themselves informed on questions under discussion. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Georgia and a Rhodes Scholar, he began newspaper work with the *Atlanta Journal*, and in 1934 joined the Washington Bureau of the Associated Press. Two years later he began reporting from overseas. In 1943 he published the controversial best seller, *Appeasement's Child*, on Franco Spain. During the war, Mr. Hamilton served in Europe and the Pacific as combat information officer.

Moderator: QUINCY HOWE—ABC radio commentator; Associate Professor of Journalism, University of Illinois.

Town Meeting is published weekly at 32 S. Fourth St., Columbus 15, Ohio, by The Town Hall, Inc., New York 36, New York. Send subscriptions and single copy orders to Town Hall, New York 36, N.Y.

Subscription price, \$5.00 a year, (Canada, \$6.00); six months, \$3.00, (Canada, \$3.50); eight weeks, \$1.00, (Canada, \$1.20); 15c a single copy. Entered as second-class matter May 9, 1942, at the Post Office at Columbus, Ohio, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

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Is the United States By-Passing the United Nations?

Moderator Howe:

Both our major political parties and nearly all our citizens agree that the United States must support the United Nations. On that general proposition there's no disagreement, least of all between our two speakers tonight. But how much support should we give the United Nations? Where? What kind of support?

Is the United Nations the cornerstone of our foreign policy and the keystone of world peace? Are we making the greatest possible use of the United Nations to stop the spread of communism and to prevent war, or is the United States by-passing the United Nations?

That's our question tonight, and it's likely to provoke more discussion than disagreement, more explanation than exhortation from our two speakers, who not only agree on the ends we should reach, but who also agree on the means by which we should reach those ends. They differ only in the way they think we should use these means.

Porter McKeever, newly appointed Director of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and former Director of Public Information for the U. S. Delegation to the United Nations, will argue that the United States is not making full and sufficient use of the United Nations machinery. Thomas J. Hamilton, veteran correspondent, now United Nations correspondent for the *New York Times*, will take the opposite view.

To start things going, I'm going to ask Mr. McKeever to tell us where we're not making the most of the United Nations.

Mr. McKeever:

Well, Mr. Howe, it is my contention that neither we nor any of the other free nations are using the United Nations enough to make it succeed. I do believe that the record of the United States is better than that of any other state; but the United States sets the pace, and I do say that our foot is not set on the United Nations path firmly enough to take us to the goal of our foreign policy: Freedom, security, expanding economic and social justice for ourselves and for our neighbors in the world community.

The United Nations is a political organism, and if an organism is not kept active, it withers away. If, through failure to keep the organism active on the major problems of international life, the United Nations should wither away, the Soviet Union would have won a tremendous victory, because in a world in which hundreds of millions of people are searching for ways with which to express their hopes of peace—without becoming the direct ally of any one nation—the death of the U. N. would make the Cominform and its stooge, the World Peace Council, the major center of attraction for the hesitant, the uncommitted, and those whose ties to us are still tenuous.

Moreover, it would deprive us of means for working towards a solution of problems which would continue to block the way to a peaceful, productive community life in the world, even if there were no Soviet problem.

So, with so much at stake, it's dangerous not to recognize that

since 1947 the United States has not been conducting the major elements of its foreign policy with United Nations machinery. I refer most specifically to the Truman Doctrine with its accompanying Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall plan, NATO, and the Mutual Security program. These, I believe, represent the vast bulk of our post-war foreign policy programs. There are other examples, but among the most important, I believe, has been our opposition to multi-lateral economic aid under United Nations direction.

It's considerations such as these that cause me to argue that we should stop calling the UN the cornerstone of our foreign policy unless we really mean to use it as such. Otherwise people will expect it to produce more in terms of action than we really intend for it to produce; and when it doesn't produce, turn against it.

What I really think we should do is to devise methods for conducting a larger share of our foreign policy program with UN machinery. We either will make the concepts contained in the UN charter vibrant and alive, or we will create an ideological vacuum into which Soviet poison will surge.

It seems to me that the UN offers the best tools man has yet fashioned for doing the jobs that must be done in the world community, and I believe we should use them more vigorously.

Moderator Howe:

Thank you, Mr. McKeever, and now Tom Hamilton, you've heard what Mr. McKeever has to say. Do you feel that we are not making the use we should of all this machinery, or are we doing about as good a job as we can?

Mr. Hamilton:

I couldn't agree more with Mr. McKeever about the necessity of keeping the UN a strong force for the maintenance of international peace and for the other objectives which we all cherish.

On the other hand, I couldn't disagree with him more on the question of whether we are using the UN to the maximum extent. I'm not worried so much about what the United States has not done in the United Nations. I am sometimes concerned about what we have done.

The reason is simple, because the United States *is* operating the major part of its foreign policy through the UN. It is, in fact, the cornerstone of our policy, as President Truman has said. Because we are one of the two great powers in the world—the Soviet Union, of course, being the other—we have had a tendency to push sometimes and lead—on more happy occasions—the UN in the direction we wanted it to go. In other words, we have insisted that the UN must do as we wanted it to do.

Take, for example, the case of admitting Italy to the UN. The Russians said they would not let the Italians in unless we allowed the Soviet satellites in. The majority of the U.N. members are so anxious to get into the U.N. Italy and Portugal and other countries that are being kept out that they would accept the Soviet terms. The United States has refused, and I think that it's very clear that the majority of the UN would like to go ahead and get the Italians in, regardless of the terms.

I was waiting to hear from Mr. McKeever some indication that

this kind of thing from the Soviet Union might possibly have something to do with the fact that the U. N. is not operating as it should. We all know it's not operating as it should, the reason being very plain. It's not the United States by-passing the U. N.—it's simply the fact that the U. N. was founded on the premise that the great powers would work together. But when the Soviet Union started on its policy of refusing to work with the United Nations, then we were left with a much weaker instrument than we thought we had when we drafted the charter at San Francisco.

Now working with the U. N. as the instrument that it now is, it is obvious that it can't achieve all that we had hoped at the time.

Now the case of technical assistance, which Mr. McKeever brought up, is an example, I think, of a reality which we all have to face. That is that the United States has been carrying on the technical assistance program since 1938, but during the World War the Rockefeller Office blazed the way for a really effective program of public works and all the things that we really want to do for the under-developed, the backward countries—as they do not like to have themselves called.

Now if the United States had decided to lump all of that into the U. N. program, much of what we had accomplished would simply have been lost. We had a much bigger operation going on. The U. N., thanks to the United States, had 20 million dollars to spend last year on technical assistance. Of that, 12 million dollars was coming from the United States.

Actually, the U. N. had so much difficulty in getting engineers and public health experts and all the

rest of the people that you have to have, that it was barely able to spend the 12 million that the United States provided. The rest went over. So there is an example of the United States supporting what the U. N. is doing, while at the same time carrying on the bigger program which lies within its capacities.

Of course, the great example, the one example which proves the point that the United States is willing to submit the very greatest issues to the U. N. is Korea, because, of course, when there was the invasion of South Korea two years ago, the natural thing would have been for us to move in directly with our armed force, unilaterally or bilaterally, or any other way you like.

We went to the U. N. We have accepted the U. N. directors. I think the Korea example is proof that the United States, when the really great issues are presented, will work with the U. N. and does with the U. N.

Moderator Howe: Well, thank you, Mr. Hamilton. I notice Mr. McKeever has made some notes there on a slip of paper, but before he even looks at those, I wonder if he'd like to make some comment on the point Mr. Hamilton made here—about all the by-passing of the United Nations being done by Russia. Aren't we worried a good deal about the mote in our own eye, and not enough by the beam in the Russians' eye, perhaps?

Mr. McKeever: Well, of course, I think it's the duty of an American citizen to have as his first consideration the policy of his own country. Of course, he can't consider that policy in a vacuum, but I don't believe it is enough

to say that the Russians are the cause of it all.

It doesn't seem to me to answer the problem which must be faced by the country which has the responsibility of being the leader of the free and those who are determined to be free. And Soviet imperialism, with its constant efforts at open and concealed aggression, is a fact which must be met.

And if at San Francisco we proceeded on the assumption of great power unity, it's perfectly clear now and has been for some years that that assumption was incorrect. It does seem to me that if our approach to the UN requires adjusting some of the assumptions and hopes that prevailed at San Francisco in 1945, that should not deter a people who have risen to greatness and power on the basis of a constitutional document which they were never afraid to find ways of adjusting to changing times and changing conditions.

Moderator Howe: Mr. Hamilton, how do you feel on that? Do you feel that he has made some points there that make you want to withdraw any of yours, or modify anything that you've said earlier about the extent of our power?

Mr. Hamilton: No, because the U. N. charter has had to be modified or reinterpreted to take care of a constant Soviet veto. We remember that when the United States did bring the Korean question into the Security Council, we were only able to get action because Mr. Malik had walked out some 6 months before. Now Mr. Malik walked back in, fortunately or unfortunately, a couple of months later. Now we had to produce the Acheson plan which will enable the General Assembly—

where there is no veto—to take the same action in the case of any future aggression that the Security Council did about Korea. There is an example of a modification or reinterpretation of the charter which had to be done.

I quite agree also that of course the United States must first look to its own policy rather than blaming anything or everything on the Russians, but it seems to me you cannot shut your eyes to the fact that the U.N. is not the effective instrument now that it was intended to be at San Francisco. What we must do and what we are doing is to work to make as effective a U. N. as we can, despite the Russian position.

Moderator Howe: Well, was that by-passing the United Nations, do you think, Mr. McKeever, when we worked those changes eliminating the veto power in certain respects?

Mr. McKeever: No, I'm glad Tom mentioned that, because it seems to me that the Uniting for Peace Resolution which was adopted by the Assembly two years ago and to which Tom referred is as fundamental an adjustment, a constitutional adjustment, of the U. N. charter as was, say, the interpretation of the commerce clause of our own Constitution. It has enabled us to send political and security problems into the veto-free General Assembly.

What has concerned me is that since the adoption of that resolution, we have not carried through the implementation of that concept. We set up, for example, the Collective Measures Committee under that resolution to stimulate countries to organize armed forces so trained and equipped that they could be mobilized on the call of the General Assembly, so that we

would not be caught with our preparations down, as we were at the time of Korea.

I think Tom will agree with me that the record of our accomplishments or even the record of our promotion of policy within the Collective Measures Committee has been considerably less than vigorous over the last two years.

Moderator Howe: How about that? Wouldn't you argue, Tom, that the Marshall plan, Truman Doctrine, and all the other things we've done, are not necessarily outside the United Nations? Isn't that part of the whole United Nations program really when you come down to it?

Mr. Hamilton: Yes, only I don't think that Mr. McKeever would really try to say that the Marshall plan or these other measures were outside the U.N. or were by-passing the U.N. or that we have been less than vigorous in actually making the Acheson plan work. I want to say that at the Paris General Assembly last fall, we were confronted with very much the same kind of difference which the British met up with, and the League of Nations met up with, when there was the question of sanctions against Italy.

That is to say, the people don't realize that if you don't hang together, you'll all hang separately. These were the people who were considering their own sovereignty, their own particular interests, and all the rest of it, so the result was that the Collective Measures Committee last summer, a year ago, had worked out some very good measures for implementing or carrying out the Acheson Plan. One of them in particular would have provided the machinery whereby if there were an aggres-

sion in Western Europe, for example, the U.N. automatically could call on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to take charge, but these same people, the same kind of people who defeated sanctions against Mussolini, defeated these recommendations; and a good deal of the heart, I must say, has gone out of the fight to make the Acheson Plan work.

I only hope that the United States will go ahead with its efforts to overcome this indifference or this cowardice which is keeping these people from really doing something. But I don't think you can call that a question of by-passing the U.N. It's a question of tactics, something like the question of Italian membership. You may disagree with the tactics, but on the fundamental tenets of policy, I think that the United States has worked extremely well in the United Nations.

Mr. McKeever: Could I make a few comments on that? First of all, I would not want anyone to understand that I think NATO, the Marshall plan, or any of those things are contrary in any way shape or form to U.N. or U.N. principles. I think that they have been almost indispensable actions to keep the peace that the U.N. is also designed to preserve. My only feeling is that I think that we could have mustered the ingenuity to use U.N. machinery more effectively and more directly than we have, and that in a political organism it's important to use the machinery or it dies.

Mr. Howe: That is, you think we could have tied those things more closely and definitely than we did with the United Nations.

Mr. McKeever: I think we could have. I don't think anyone

should minimize the problems that we have of getting other countries, other free countries, to see the importance of the U. N. machinery. I think we have been the leaders, and I think we've been out in front of nearly all of them.

But it seems to me that we made a fundamental decision at the end of this war. We had the power and we had the troops. We had the material power to establish a Pax Americana for a long time to come on the earth's surface, but we decided, we made the choice that we were going to try to establish not a balance of power ruled by one country, but to establish a mechanism by which nations could cooperatively solve their mutual problems. That is a pioneering and a revolutionary idea, and I think we should recognize that it takes a lot of missionary work even among people who are used to democratic processes.

All I'm pleading for is that we pursue that missionary goal with more zeal, more ingenuity, more vigor than I think we have, particularly in the last four or five years.

Mr. Howe: Well, this is more a matter of emphasis, Mr. Hamilton, than of anything else. Where would you say that we shouldn't go as far as Mr. McKeever suggests? Do you think it would have been risky if we had tied some of these organizations in more closely with the U. N.? What would have been the risks involved, perhaps in tying the Truman plan more closely with the United Nations policy?

Mr. Hamilton: Yes, well, of course, the Truman Doctrine was in a moment of crisis, or so it seemed at the time, when the

British had suddenly decided that they couldn't carry on their commitments in Greece and in Turkey at a time when the communist-inspired - and - led civil war was threatening to overcome the Greek government. There simply wasn't time to take the matter into the U. N. But there is a question of tactics, because that was certainly an excellent decision. It was an inevitable decision, but it was one which was clumsily done; because the President announced it, and the matter was before the Security Council, but no steps were taken to communicate the decision to the Security Council.

There was quite a good deal of complaint at the time, not over what was being done, but the way it was being done. And then we all remember that Senator Vandenberg introduced an amendment in the Senate which provided that the Security Council should be notified, and also that at any time the Security Council felt that these steps were not necessary, they should be stopped.

Unfortunately the time has not yet come when we can say that either Greece or Turkey is safe from communist threat, but there's an example of what I was trying to say about our tactics sometimes leaving very much to be desired, but the great decisions have been correct.

Mr. Howe: But you wouldn't then be so very far from him on that particular point. You'd say on the Truman Doctrine that we should have worked more with the United Nations, what Mr. McKeever was saying. Doesn't the difference come when we talk about more recent matters like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? Wouldn't that be a case

where Mr. McKeever's argument and yours would be more at variance with each other?

Mr. Hamilton: Well, as we both mentioned, the Collective Measures Committee a year ago did work out the machinery whereby in case of an aggression in the European area, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be brought in. I don't think you could have done anything more because the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not really based upon the regional arrangements part of the charter, but upon the self-defense clause. That's the clause that safeguards the rights of individual and collective defense against an armed attack, and that is the provision under which we have acted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and is the provision under which we acted in Korea.

As the Russians pointed out about the regional organization, the trouble with that one is that the charter says specifically that no steps, no enforcement steps as they call it—in other words, no force—could be used by a regional organization without the prior approval of the Security Council. So I don't see any way that NATO could have been brought into the U.N. framework except through the Collective Measures Committee.

Mr. McKeever: Well, I think it could have been, Tom, because that's where I think the Uniting for Peace resolution and the new role of the General Assembly is a potentiality that we haven't yet realized. It's partly a matter of attitude. As you remember, in Paris we were involved in a radio program in which we got one of the top officials of NATO to come and talk. I'll mention it, because

it's an ABC network show—the "United or Not" program. The public relations director accepted that engagement with the proviso that there be no question asked about the relationship between NATO and the U.N. You will remember that we went to work on that and the gentleman in question saw that there was a very strong relationship, and when the program went on he made a very fine statement about the relationship. But it's an example of the attitude, the matter of emphasis, that I think we've lost sight of in many of these things.

And if I may, before we go into questions, I'd like to make just one more point. That is in looking over the role of the U.N. in this post-war world, where the difficulties with the Soviet Union became so apparent, it would seem to me that as we approached a clear picture, that the U.N. was going to have difficulty making the progress in the security and the political field that we'd hoped for at San Francisco. It would have been logical to assume then that if we wanted to make the U.N. an important, vital part of our foreign policy, we would have developed the work of the U.N. in the economic, social, and trusteeship fields. I think that we have failed to do that. I think that symbolic of this fact is that out of the staff of 180 people at the United States mission to the United Nations, the total number of officers dedicated to the Economic and Social Council is 3, and we do not have even one full-time man working on the problems of trusteeship in non-self-governing territories.

I do want to throw this in, because it's not that Ambassador Austin hasn't seen this problem

and wanted to do something about it, but as a conscientious public servant, he's never going to build a staff for the sake of building a staff. He's going to build a staff that's commensurate to the policy that we want to implement in it, and we have not had a policy of developing and carrying on our economic and social and trusteeship problems through U.N. machinery with the vigor that I think the changed conditions required of us.

Moderator Howe: Just a word from Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. Hamilton: The thing I'd like to say is although the U. S. delegation to the U.N. is, of course, important, and the U.N. itself plays a very important role in economic matters, nevertheless the basic work is done by what we call the generic term "U.N." It isn't done in New York. It isn't

done by the U.N. itself. It's done by all manner of what we call specialized agencies—agencies affiliated with the United Nations,—such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, or the World Health Organization, and so forth. Their headquarters are outside New York, so I don't think that a shortage of economists and the rest of it in the American delegation means anything.

Mr. McKeever: Oh, no, that was simply symbolic, Tom. But let's look at the Food and Agricultural Organization. Its total budget in terms of what we're doing in that field is very small. I'm not sure of the exact figure, but I doubt if the Food and Agricultural Organization has a budget of much more than 8 or 12 million. I don't think it's beyond that, which, in terms of what's being spent in this kind of problem, is piddling.



QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Moderator Howe: Well now, gentlemen, I think we've got to the time where we can take our questions.

Man: My question is addressed to either Mr. Hamilton, Mr. McKeever or both. Since in the final analysis, U.S. policy is American public opinion, is American public opinion by-passing the United Nations?

Mr. Howe: Would you take that, Mr. Hamilton, first, speaking for the *New York Times*?

Mr. Hamilton: There I think there is much more danger, because I think that the policy laid down by the Administration has unfortunately been ahead of public opinion in this country. You have only to consider the attacks that have

been made upon the United Nations right now. All sorts of people are saying that to fly the U.N. flag is somehow disloyal to the United States, and all the rest of it. I think that's what we have to worry about—the people who are not sufficiently informed about the aims of the United Nations.

Mr. McKeever: Well, I think there is a very real question there, too. I think one of the problems has been, however, that we tend to confuse public opinion by referring to it as the cornerstone of our foreign policy, when in terms of our action, it's the pebble. And I think too that the whole question of getting not only the public at large, but career diplomats, accustomed to the conduct of multi-

lateral diplomacy, as against the cold-style unilateral or bilateral diplomacy, is one that's going to take some time and take a lot of educational work. I wouldn't in any of these remarks want to criticize merely the Administration or that favorite whipping-boy of a lot of people, the Department of State. I think all of us—individual citizens, groups, organizations, government, Congress — all have to share a large part of what I feel are the shortcomings of our approach to winning the cold war.

Man: My question also may be addressed to either Mr. Hamilton or Mr. McKeever, preferably the latter. Don't you think that the U.S. is hurting the objectives of the U.N. by coercing other nations to follow in its wake, irrespective of their ideas, wishes or necessities?

Mr. McKeever: I would say that the U.N. Charter represents the code of conduct, the standards of ethics, the principles that were universally agreed upon at San Francisco as being essential to world peace and security. It seems to me that our job and the job of every peace-loving and peace-loving citizen is to try to get every country, every group, every state to adhere as closely as possible to those principles and standards of conduct. I think until we do, we'll never have a secure or free world.

Lady: Mr. Hamilton, wouldn't you say that in failing to ratify the Genocide Convention the United States is by-passing the United Nations?

Mr. Hamilton: Technically I wouldn't call it by-passing the United Nations, but I think it's an example of a situation which makes it difficult for us to go on with our fight for other things; because we took a leading part in drafting the

Genocide Convention, and now we don't ratify it or haven't so far.

Man: Mr. McKeever, the United States pays 75 per cent for the upkeep of the United Nations. Then what is wrong with us taking the leading role?

Mr. McKeever: I think we should take the leading role. I think the United Nations represents the embodiment in a world community of an American way of dealing with problems, a free association of free peoples for the solution of their common problems.

I would warn you not to get too intrigued with this business of percentages, because the U.N., even though we do carry a large proportion of it, still costs the American taxpayers something less than 100 million dollars for everything we do in the U. N., which again is another indication that in terms of our total expenditures for foreign policy, the U.N. is at the short end of the stick.

Man: Mr. Hamilton, the United States is maintaining military bases in 60 nations and major islands throughout the world. Is this not by-passing the United Nations? I'm told that Will Rogers used to say, "Anybody who goes a thousand miles to defend himself is looking for trouble."

Mr. Hamilton: First of all, I will say that I can't affirm or deny that we have bases in 60 countries. There are only 60 members in the U.N., which includes most of the sovereign states of the earth, so I would rather doubt if there were 60. In any case, I don't know of any base that we maintain in any country without the consent of that country, which I think is a pretty good start.

I think it's further plain that the bases that we maintain are part of a defensive system against com-

munist aggression which is set forth in our North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in our treaties with the Latin American countries, and in our treaties of defense with the island countries of the Pacific; so I would certainly not accept any suggestions from the terms of Will Rogers or anybody else that it is aggression or by-passing the U.N.

Man: It is by-passing the United Nations. NATO is not in the spirit of the United Nations, in any sense whatever. All these attempts to organize coalitions throughout the world are not in the spirit of the United Nations; and when I said that 60 nations and major islands were occupied—had military bases occupied by the United States—I meant it, and you know it. I included major islands in addition to the actual countries of the world.

Mr. McKeever: I would like to join Tom in what he said. I do not believe it is by-passing the United Nations to establish bases for the sake of resisting Soviet aggression. I believe that to the degree that we resist Soviet aggression, we serve the future of the United Nations. All I hope for is that we can find more effective ways of linking that operation to save the world against aggression with U.N. machinery and with the U.N. symbol; because if there is to be war in this world, we want it to be war for the defense of the Union. (*applause*)

Man: Would Mr. McKeever care to comment on the share taken in United Nations affairs by, shall we say, the less powerful members, such as Great Britain?

Mr. McKeever: Well, I hesitate to comment in any detail on another nation's foreign policy. I'll go back to what I said. I believe, even though it's inadequate, the United States has done more than any other nation in the world to

make the U.N. go, and I would include Great Britain in that statement.

Man: Mr. Hamilton, I am a student in Salinas, California, and would like to know this. In view of the many pressure groups that we have in the United States today who are putting up a stand and refusing to permit the teaching of the United Nations in the schools, as a result of all this, what can our public opinion do to combat these pressure groups?

Mr. Hamilton: Well, there's one way, and what I hope is going to happen is this. If an election year has produced some of the more absurd criticisms of the United Nations, and the United States' part in it, when the election is over, it will die down.

In the meanwhile, I think that most—and I think it's the least, also—that any of us can do who are interested in the United Nations is to study its work in detail to be able to answer ill-informed statements to give people the true facts, to keep in touch with local Congressmen in support of United States action in the United Nations, and in general to do what we can to be good citizens of what we hope will be some day a world community.

Man: Mr. McKeever, with two different forces in the world which are the exact opposites, can the United Nations be expected to settle these disputes when each force has a veto power?

Mr. McKeever: Well, I don't believe there is a veto power anymore. There are ways in which to get it done, and I do believe the existence of the Soviet Union has certainly complicated the life of the United Nations, but it's made the need for it greater. It's made the need for activating the ideas

and the principles of the United Nations an even greater need in the world community.

Man: Mr. Hamilton, recently the Swedish government decided not to bring before the U.N. their case concerning the downing of the Swedish planes in the Baltic by Russia. The Swedish government has therefore shown a lack of confidence in the United Nations. Do you feel because of this lack of confidence being shown, after 7 years of United Nations, the United States should work only through the United Nations, or should we continue to set up these other organizations and sort of by-pass the United Nations?

Mr. Hamilton: Well, as far as the Swedish plane is concerned, I must say I can't even begin to guess the reasons why the Swedish government decided not to bring it before the U. N. One obvious reason, of course, would be that the Russians would veto anything that was done about it. Of course, you have also to consider the fact that Sweden has refused to join up with the North Atlantic Treaty organization and in general has tried to work on the theory that it can stay out of organizations or alliances or what-not and go its own way.

I would like to say one thing, to repeat. I think the implication was made by another questioner. I do not consider the North Atlantic Treaty organization, or these other mutual defense organizations, contrary to either the letter or the spirit of the United Nations Charter, for the Charter specifically safeguards the right of individual and collective defense against an armed attack. That's what these mutual treaties of defense call for.

Mr. Howe: I think it's just a question really here between our

two speakers of the use that's made of these organizations. They aren't in themselves by-passing, but it's how they're used. Let's have the next question.

Man: It's for Mr. McKeever. My information is that the U.S. Government contributes nothing to the U.N. Refugee Emergency Fund for the work of the High Commissioner of Refugees. Isn't this an example of by-passing the U.N.?

Mr. McKeever: I believe we should get in and make that operation go just as much as we can. I believe the solution of the refugee problem is a human problem that should concern us deeply, and I believe multilateral international organization is the way to do it.

Man: My question is addressed first to Mr. Hamilton and then to Mr. McKeever. How can mass media, such as radio, TV, and the press, make greater use of UNESCO material as part of the U.N.'s public opinion offensive?

Mr. Hamilton: Well, it's rather difficult for me to say very much about UNESCO because, as you know, its headquarters is at Paris, and material for the press and so forth is sent from there.

Mr. Howe: How about you, Mr. McKeever?

Mr. McKeever: Well, ardently as I am espousing the U.N. cause here tonight, I do believe one way would be for UNESCO to improve its materials.

Mr. Howe: That's a good answer, now the next question.

Man: Mr. McKeever, would you propose that the truce talks in Korea be conducted by a truly representative U.N. team, rather than the old U. S. team we have now negotiating?

Mr. McKeever: Well, I think,

while I agree with what Tom said earlier about the importance of our entry into Korea as a symbol and a practical demonstration of the importance we attach to saving collective security, I do feel that on the political side of the Korean war, we've waged it with something less than imagination. For example, I think it is a sad commentary when a member of the Senate has to suggest that we send an international observers' team to the prisoner of war camps. If you're running a United Nations war, that should have happened automatically.

Also I'd like to say just one other thing. For example, it would have been wise, I think, if instead of calling a force that has 18 national contingents in it the "8th United States army," it would have been wiser to call that the "First United Nations Army."

Mr. Howe: I think we have time for just about one more question.

Man: Mr. Hamilton, isn't the present action in Korea which is essentially a U.N. action, but which is actually led by the United States, an indictment that we have

seen fit to by-pass the United Nations?

Mr. Hamilton: No, I don't accept that, because, as I said in my opening statement, we would have had the right under the charter to send our troops to Korea without bringing the matter before the United Nations at all. Now it's very clear that if it had not been for the strong action taken by the United States delegation in the U.N., and above all, of course, if it hadn't been for the fact that we were actually ready, willing, and determined to send armed forces at once, the U. N. would have done nothing at all.

But nevertheless it's quite the opposite of saying that we were by-passing the U.N. On the contrary, we were using the U.N. for an action that we could have quite legally and even morally taken ourselves.

Mr. Howe: Thank you very much, Mr. Hamilton, and thank you, too, Mr. McKeever, for the interesting discussion you've given on tonight's question on by-passing the United Nations. So plan to be with us next week and every week at the sound of the Crier's Bell.

FOR FURTHER STUDY OF THIS WEEK'S TOPIC

Background Questions

1. How far has the United States obligated itself in ratifying the United Nations Charter?
 - a. What rights, privileges and liberties have we surrendered, if any?
 - b. What duties and obligations have we assumed?
2. Has the United States ever violated any of its U. N. commitments?
3. Did the United States ever consider the United Nations as the "cornerstone of its foreign policy?" Does it do so today?
4. In view of the breakdown of big-power cooperation upon which the effectiveness of the United Nations as a security agency was predicated, can the United States realistically regard the U. N. as the major instrument of its foreign policy?
 - a. Can the United States let important measures affecting its basic security be blocked by a Soviet veto?
 - b. Should the formulation of United States policy be circumscribed by the ability of the U. N. to implement it?
5. To what extent should any nation regard the U. N. as an instrument of its foreign policy?
6. Do the Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, North Atlantic Treaty and Pacific defense treaties constitute violations of the United Nations Charter?
7. Are these measures necessary for the preservation of the security of the nations involved? Are they legitimately defensive measures?
8. Could the benefits derived from these measures have been as effectively guaranteed by the United Nations?
9. Was the unwillingness of the United States to bring the Tunisian question before the Security Council an example of by-passing the United Nations?
10. Should the Technical Assistance Program be administered exclusively by the U. N.?
11. Could the swift action to meet aggression in Korea have been taken had the Soviet Union been participating in the deliberations of the Security Council at that time?
12. Is there any justification for the fear that various U. N. covenants and conventions approved by our Senate in the form of treaties are superseding American laws and endangering the basic constitutional rights of our citizens?
13. If yes, should the proposal to make treaties subordinate to the constitution and the laws of the United States be adopted?
14. To what extent can and should the United States utilize the U. N. in its efforts to combat Communist imperialism?
15. Should the U. N. be reorganized in order to make it a more effective instrument for combatting Soviet aggression? Or, is the fact that the U. N. provides the United States and the Soviet Union with a common meeting ground and forum, its greatest contribution to world security?
16. Should the U. N. discuss conflicts that it is incapable of solving? Do such discussions clarify the issues and enhance the U. N.'s prestige, or do they antagonize people and blind them to the many vital services the U. N. can perform?
17. Does the effectiveness of the United Nations depend upon a realistic appraisal of its ability to enforce its own decisions?

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